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Abstract 
This paper is a study of the viability of market-based crop insurance using whole-farm planning. 
Utility-efficient programming (UEP) is used to determine demand on the basis of transaction costs 
and level of farmer's risk aversion. Farm-level data for the utility-efficient programming model were 
derived from a panel data set for specialised arable farms in the Netherlands. The data included 
information about the stochastic structure of yields and prices as well as other physical and financial 
parameters. 
The UEP results indicated under which conditions farmers are likely to participate. The 
results show that the degree of risk aversion affects the optimal choice to retain yield risk or to 
transfer the risk by means of an insurance contract. Although the viability of market-based crop 
insurance is partly conditional upon the (currently uncertain) transaction costs, the fact that 
farmers under study are relatively wealthy reduces the chances of any substantial demand for 
such a market-based product. Alternative risk-coping options, such as use of credit to enhance 
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farm-firm liquidity in adverse years, are likely to dominate a commercial crop insurance risk 
strategy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
To safeguard against adverse weather conditions, various forms of subsidised multi-peril crop 
insurance exist in a number of countries, such as the U.S. and Canada. By contrast, such 
comprehensive schemes covering yield or revenue have till now been relatively uncommon in the 
EU. The commercial crop insurance schemes that do exist in the EU cover mainly crop losses 
resulting from hail and windstorms. However, there has recently been a considerable amount of 
interest in member states in the scope for commercial or subsidized crop insurance (Meuwissen 
et. al., 2003). 
By taking up a market-based crop insurance contract a farmer will normally be accepting 
a small reduction in expected net returns, but is guarding against unfavourable outcomes. A risk-
averse farmer would consider buying such a contract and the decision would depend on the level 
of the premium relative to the benefit perceived from the reduction in down-side risk (Arrow, 
1996; Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
Although sharing risks can increase a farmer's utility, (s)he is not likely to share all risks. It 
is (largely) up to each individual farmer to decide which risks, and which part of them, to share. 
Factors that may influence this decision include a farmer's degree of risk aversion, the costs 
involved in risk sharing, the relative size of a particular risk, the correlation of the risk with other 
risks, other sources of indemnity, a farmer's perception of the nature of the risks, and the farmer's 
income and wealth (Barry et al, 1995; Hardaker et al, 2004; Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
Also important for the farmer's decision about which risks to share and which to bear is 
that this decision is part of the overall risk management problem facing of the farmer of selecting 
a risk-efficient portfolio of on-farm and off-farm risky activities and risk-reducing instruments. 
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Thus, for example, a decision about whether to insure against a particular risk, and if so to what 
extent, cannot properly be made without reference to other risky choices. Arable farms in Europe 
are typically multi-commodity operations. Hence, crop mix selections are important in the context 
of risk management, as a diversified production program is risk reducing in itself. In general, it 
will be impossible to say whether or not the introduction of a new risk management instrument 
will be attractive to farmers1. It depends on the terms of the contract, the interactions with other 
risks on the farm and on the farmer's degree of risk aversion. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the viability of market-based crop insurance by 
assessing farm-level demand. To assess that demand, a farm specific portfolio approach is 
essential for the reasons just outlined and to account for the differences in the individual farm 
stochastic structure and operating constraints. To this end, utility-efficient programming (UEP) 
(Hardaker, 2004; Lien and Hardaker, 2001) is used to determine the demand for a market-based 
crop insurance contract as affected by transaction costs and farm circumstances, particularly 
including the farmer's degree of risk aversion. Farm level data are used to specify the states of 
nature that describe the joint distribution of net revenues from alternative cropping and crop 
insurance options, as well as other farm specific characteristics. 
The paper is organised as follows: first, the utility-efficient programming model is 
elaborated. Subsequently, the analysed data are described. Finally the results are presented and 
discussed. 
1
 The above statements imply that there are no universal rules about which risks to share and 
which not. Only occasionally is it not completely up to the farmer what risks are managed and by 
what type of strategies. For example, lenders may require that farmers use one or more risk 
management strategies, such as crop insurance and forward contracting, when a loan is contracted 
(Harwoode/a/., 1999). 
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2. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
2.1 UTILITY-EFFICIENT PROGRAMMING 
The UEP model is formulated as follows (Lambert and McCarl, 1985; Hardaker et al., 2004): 
maxE(U) = pU(z,r), r varied 
subject to 
A x < b (1) 
Cx - Iz = uf 
x > 0 
where: U(.) is a monotonie and concave utility function; z is a vector of net income per year by 
state; r is a measure of risk aversion; p is a vector of state probabilities; A is a matrix of technical 
coefficients; x is a vector of activity levels to be determined; b is a vector of resource stocks; C is 
a matrix of net revenue per activity per state; I is an identity matrix; u is a vector of ones; and f is 
vector of fixed costs. The utility function is defined for the measure of risk aversion, r, which can 
be, for example, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA), ra, or the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA), rr (Hardaker et al., 2004). In the present study the following negative exponential 
function is used to incorporate CARA: 
U = l -exp( -z r , ) , r a >0 (2) 
where r„ is an assumed constant measure of absolute risk aversion over the range of z of concern 
derived from the utility function for wealth W. 
In assessing the measure of risk aversion, it may be noted that the value of the function 
for relative risk aversion with respect to wealth rr(W) might reasonably be assumed to range from 
0.5 (hardly risk averse at all) to about four (very risk averse), according to the risk attitude of the 
individual (Anderson and Dillon, 1992). Often rr(W) is assumed to be about one (somewhat risk 
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averse) (Arrow, 1970), and it seems reasonable to that the particular value of the function would 
be relatively constant for small changes in W. The absolute risk aversion function is given by 
definition as r„(W) = rr(W)/W. Under the condition that preferences do not change whether the 
outcomes are expressed in terms of W or transitory income z, i.e. under the assumption of asset 
integration, it is assumed that ra(W) ~ ra(z). Then assuming that variation in z is small relative to 
W so that rr(W) changes little with W, ra = ra(z) = rr(W)/W (Hardaker, 2000). 
2.2 OPTIMISATION MODEL 
Data on specialised firms with arable crops covering the period 1990-2000 came from a stratified 
sample of Dutch arable firms keeping accounts for the Dutch Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (FADN). The firms typically remain in the FADN panel for approximately seven or eight 
years. For the analysis one 'average' specialized arable farm was selected with respect to size and 
cropping plan from the 718 available arable farms. The size of the selected farm was 38 ha. Also, this 
particular farm cultivated the main arable crops, which are winter wheat, sugar beet, consumption 
potatoes and onion seed. 
Yield and prices of this specific farm were subsequently detrended and deflated (Kobzar et. 
al., 2004a). The UEP model was defined with a number of constraints. Land use was constrained by 
the total area of the farm (38 ha) and by crop rotation limits set in accord with information given in 
KWIN (2001). A limit on the maximum amount of sugar beet was based on individual farm quota. 
Most field operations have to be performed during a certain limited periods. To take into account the 
peak periods in labour and machine use, labour constraints were added to the model using data 
obtained from KWIN (2001). For a fuller description of this model, see Kobzar et. al. (2004b). The 
farm specific detrended gross margin components per crop and state are summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Distribution of activities by state of nature1' 
cv 
] 
Vield(kjj) 6,007 7,616 7,423 6,565 5,764 5,363 7,117 6,668 6,565 807 12% 
WinterWheat Price(Euro) 0 253 0256 0263 0.162 0 175 0.160 0.151 0 12 0 193 0056 29% 
Variable costs (Euro) 275 196 327 157 239 291 304 283 259 58 22% 
Yield (kg) 74,654 68,685 80,967 59,682 56,729 54,205 56,593 69,815 65.166 9,773 15% 
Sugar Beet Price (Euro) 0.049 0.054 0.047 0.047 0 061 0.056 0.058 0,06566 0 055 0.007 13% 
Variable costs (Euro) 376 303 212 244 211 275 323 281.465 278 56 20% 
Yield (kg) 46,109 35,527 31,594 46,167 29,945 26,570 30,463 28.225 34,325 7,741 23% 
Consumption Potatos Price(Euro) 0 194 0.163 0027 0 100 0652 0215 0038 0.14884 0.192 0.198 103% 
Variable costs (Euro) 2,217 2,313 2,191 1.452 1,077 1,619 1,264 848 1,623 562 35% 
Yield(kg) 29,709 31,024 39,463 40,796 36,011 23,898 58,236 39,695 37,354 10,276 28% 
Onion Seed Price(Euro) 0211 0345 0287 0.260 0 308 0361 0315 033134 0 302 0 049 16% 
Variable costs (Euro) 682 4,931 6,518 5,106 3.286 2,657 4,407 3,300 3,861 1783 46% 
11
 The eight states are assumed to be equi-probable and these probabilities and states are assumed to capture the 
farmer's perception of the risks to be faced from unstable crop yields in the coming cropping year. 
The model was formulated to optimize the portfolio of crops grown in the coming year, including 
options to insure a shortfall of the long-term average yield of each crop. Besides the four cropping 
activities in the UEP model as presented in Table 1, we added four additional activities to 
represent the outcomes under a yield insurance activity. The yield insurance scheme evaluated is 
assumed to cover losses below 85% of the long-term average individual farm yield. 
3 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this section we present the impact of three main input parameters on the demand for a market-
based crop insurance product. The first and second parameter under investigation comprise relative 
risk aversion with respect to wealth, r^W), and wealth (W). We assumed three alternatives levels of 
r,(W), namely 0.5, 2 and 4. The corresponding levels for ra(z) are approximated (ra(z) = rr(W)/W). 
The wealth parameter was based on the FADN panel. In 2002, the total assets of an average Dutch 
arable farm are approximately 1 million Euro, of which 250,000 Euro is debt and 750,000 Euro is 
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equity. The solvency ratio (equity-to-asset ratio) is therefore 75%, but a substantial heterogeneity 
exists between farms. Therefore the demand for insurance is determined for two alternative levels of 
wealth, namely 125,000 and 750,000 (thus a solvency ratio of 33% and 75%, respectively). 
The third parameter is associated with the (currently uncertain) transaction costs of a market-
based insurance contract. The premium for the hypothetical crop insurance option is composed of 
two parts, one designed to provide for the payment of losses and a second, referred to as loading, 
to cover the expenses of operation (e.g., administrative expenses, profit and a margin for 
contingencies). That part of the rate that is intended to cover losses is called pure premium when 
expressed in absolute monetary values, and the expected loss ratio when expressed as a 
percentage. For example, Dutch agricultural hail insurance schemes operate with a long-term 
average loss ratio of about 55% (Swiss Re, 1997). The loading that is added to the pure premium 
is assumed to be 10% or 25% of the expected indemnity payments in order to determine the impact 
on demand. 
A brief summary of the model results under alternative assumptions is presented in Table 
2, focussing on the percentage of area insured per cropping activity. 
Table 2: Results UEP model for alternative assumptions. 
Rr(w) 
4 
2 
0.5 
4 
2 
0.5 
4 
2 
0.5 
4 
2 
0.5 
Solvency 
ratio 
33% 
33% 
33% 
33% 
33% 
33% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
Loading 
10% 
10% 
10% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
10% 
10% 
10% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
Winter 
Wheat 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
Percenta] 
Sugar Beet 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
0% 
100% 
100% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
ge of hectares insured 
Consumption 
potatos Onion seed 
86% 
86% 
56% 
73% 
61% 
0% 
70% 
70% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
0% 
100% 
100% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
Total 
74% 
74% 
64% 
70% 
66% 
0% 
69% 
69% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
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One of the main observations is that the degree of risk aversion affects the optimal activity 
choice. A farmer who is hardly risk averse at all, r,(W)=0.5, would only opt for partial insurance in 
the case of a relative low equity and low transaction costs. In all other cases for such a hardly risk 
averse farmer, it is not likely that crop yields will be insured. 
Very risk averse farmers, r,(W)=4, are more inclined to insure part of their crops even if 
they have a relative high level of wealth as long as the transactions costs are not excessive. In the 
case of relatively high transaction costs, there is demand for insurance only if the farmer's wealth is 
relative low and (s)he is moderately risk averse (rr(W)>2). 
Crops that are more likely to be insured are those with a relative high yield risk (see for 
example CV values of yield in Table 1). 
In general, the results indicate that market-based crop insurance will not be attractive 
because of the expected relatively high transaction cost (for example, Dutch agricultural hail 
insurance schemes have a loading of 45%), the applied crop diversification in the portfolio and 
the fact that farmers under study are relative wealthy and therefore assumed to be not very averse 
to risk. 
4. DISCUSSION 
Financial management options like the availability of a (expanded) line of credit would enhance a 
farm firm's liquidity in adverse years. Such a strategy, not accounted for in our annual model, 
might be dominant because of the relative low interest rate in comparison to the loading of a 
standard private insurance policy. Most of the adverse production years leading to potential 
indemnity payments under crop insurance cause only liquidity problems. Many arable farmers 
may well be able to 'ride out' the bad times by using savings or credit. Their access to such credit 
is likely to be good because they usually have substantial equity, mostly in the form of their 
investment in land. Use of insurance is likely to be of interest to such farmers only for 
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catastrophic events which threaten the continuity of the firm, not for adverse years causing 
"normal" income variation. 
For farmers, insuring their whole-farm income is likely to be more attractive (i.e. closer 
to optimising the welfare of the farm family) than insuring separate components of their income, 
such as the revenue or only the yield of a particular cropping activity. In the current study we 
focused on only the yield risk component. Although price components might be packaged and 
marketed via revenue insurance or whole-farm income insurance, the mechanism and thus risk 
loading differ from "traditional" indemnity insurance. The latter is based on the principle of 
pooling which enables any losses to be spread over a large group, assuming that a large 
proportion of the exposure units will not incur losses at the same time. But prices of commodities 
are completely systemic risks. Hedging by means of the futures market is a more appropriate risk 
financing tool (but could still be marketed under the umbrella of an insurance contract). A 
prerequisite is that a futures market exists for the specific cropping activities, which does not hold 
for most of the crops in the Netherlands. 
Subsidising insurance schemes will increase potential participation. In the USA, private 
companies deliver and service subsidised crop and revenue insurance schemes. Subsidies are 
provided for the farmer-paid premiums, for delivery and administration, and for the private sector 
reinsurance. Farmers in the USA pay on average 25 per cent of the total cost of these risk 
management programs. In Canada, the government is the sole provider of multiple peril crop and 
revenue insurance policies. The subsidy position is similar to that of the USA although there are 
differences in exact arrangements in the different Provinces. Naturally, many farmers find it 
attractive to purchase crop insurance when the expected indemnities available exceed the cost of 
insuring. Serious questions, however, have been raised about the incentives in the USA programs 
(Meuwissen et. al., 2003; Skees, 1999): 
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1) government subsidies to insurance companies are provided in a way that leads to rent 
seeking behaviour by insurers; 
2) schemes are not well designed with respect to adverse selection and moral hazard; 
3) transaction costs are high (including monitoring and administrative costs); 
4) the government in the USA continues to provide ad hoc disaster relief (thereby 
undermining the whole insurance system); and 
5) The schemes are significantly distorting - the high subsidy element tends to encourage 
excess production and to drive up land prices. Moreover, there can be inappropriate 
encouragement for farmers to shift into more risky forms of production for which the 
ratio of indemnities to premiums are more favourable from their perspectives. 
As a consequence we have what might be called "incentive problems": neither farmers nor 
insurance companies get the right incentives for responsible (socially efficient) risk management 
and as a consequence may be induced to misallocate resources. 
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